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Third World nations did not shape the world's
institutions of production and exchange and
have virtually no say in them. But we are
dominated by them. It is this domination by
forces over which we have no control that each
one of us has rejected. And our coming
together in the Group of 77 has the purpose
of enabling us to deal on terms of greater
equality with an existing Centre of Power. Ours
is basically a unity of opposition. And it is a
unity of nationalisms . . . The immediate
interests, and the negotiating priorities of
different Group of 77 members are therefore
very different. Consequently there is a tendency
for sub-groups to develop . . . [which] can be
useful; it enables us to carry on particular
detailed negotiations with the industrialised
countries . . . to ensure that all interests within
the Group of 77 are covered. . . But this kind
of sub-division is also very dangerous
'Divide and Rule' is an old technique of
domination; the developed countries are not
unaware of its usefulness.
J. K. Nyerere
(in UNCTAD (1) 1979, Annex II: 2-3)
Trade after Tokyo
The Manila UNCTAD was not the only forum
in which Third World attempts to achieve inter-
national economic change met a stone wall (or
feather pillow) unwillingness to negotiate
substantively in 1979.1 Equally disappointing-
and potentially more dangerouswas the Tokyo
Round of multilateral trade negotiations (MTN).
While UNCTAD is perceived by the Group of 77
as a better forum for far-reaching talks on trade,
1 Earlier versions of this paper with more attention to
1969-79 events and negotiations were presented at the
Asian Conference on Trade and Development (Marga
Institute. International Centre for Law in Development,
Sri Lanka Foundation Institute) in Colombo in February
and at seminars of the Centre for Research on the New
International Economic Order in February and July 1979.
These will appear as 'Trade and Development: A Con-
ceptual Framework' in Tiruchelvam and Krishnaswamy,
eds. (forthcoming 1979) and Sengupta, cd. (forthcoming
1980). It makes extensive use of information and ideasfrom participants in these seminars and particularly ofpapers on the Tokyo Round of GATT by S. K. Bagchi
and R. Krishnamurti which will appear in the Sengupta
volume. The author wishes to thank the participants in
these seminarsand in particular Kamal Hossainfor
information, ideas and criticisms but remains responsible
for how he has used (Or misused') them.
GA1'T is where the action is in terms of operat-
ing and modifying the existing structures.
The present context is one of a rising New Pro-
tectionism eroding the liberalised trade system
built up over the period 1945-73; an erosion con-
cealed by the bright lights of GATT where a
triumphal march toward free trade is asserted to
exist, even though in the dark back alleys of
national (and EEC) action, those principles are
increasingly being attacked; vide the 1978 version
of the Multifibre Textile Arrangements (MFA),
or the growing structure of' 'voluntary agree-
ments' and 'reference prices' in sectors such as
steel and shipbuilding. The most endangered
economies are those of the Group of 77and
especially those committed to export-oriented
growth through manufacturing. The access for
their exports legally available under GATT is
being eroded de facto when they have the
strongest need to use it and, in some cases, have
built up the capacity to do so. They are in the
greatest danger because the major industrial
economies perceive discrimination against them
as being safe. Nobody talks seriously of 'selective
safeguards' against the USA or West Germany
orquiteagainst Japan, and the assertion of
'unfair competition' is largely either an abusive
rephrasing of 'too competitive for us to match'
or an hypocrisy. Whatever the limitations of neo-
free trade as enshrined in GATT, selective hostile
discrimination (the growing alternative today) is
clearly worse for the members of the Group of
77.
Disorder and Containment: the North Looks
Inward
The reasons for the changed trendchanged since
the Tokyo Round opened in 1973are not hard
to find. The inflation, unemployment, slow
growth, and external imbalance crisis of the
industrial capitalist (and to a lesser degree
industrial socialist) economies which began in
the late 1960s has gathered momentum and
proved resistant to treatment. Meanwhilewith
the sole exception of petroleumthe Southern
challenge has been contained. The major capita-
list industrial economies therefore see internal
and North/North issues as having top priority and
North/South as relatively minor. Worse, to a
limited but growing extent, they see exporting
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their troubles to the Southfor example, by
limiting imports or cutting aidas one of their
secondary domestic options. That is why GATT
itself is being eroded, why the Tokyo Round made
virtually no progress on issues of primary concern
to the 77, and why the emphasis was on special
codes to protect North/North trade against a
non-tariff barrier trade war.
From a Group of 77 (or individual South state)
point of view, the most important question is
what can be done now to halt, and ideally
reverse, the deterioration of effective access for
their exports. Whatever may be said about export-
oriented growth, even the most austere and
inward looking development in all but a handful
of Third World states will require enhanced
import capacity and, therefore, access for
exports. Before looking at areas in which policy
initiatives might be successful, it is desirable
briefly to review the outcome of the Tokyo Round
and to raise queries about the tactics used during
it by GATI"s Third World members.
MTN: State of Play
Most evaluations of the Tokyo Round treat its
implications for the periphery as secondary, if
they mention them at all. Those concentrating
on Third World aspects tend to adopt a 'half full'
versus 'half empty' approach to measuring results.
Those written from an UNCTAD orientation (cg.
that by R. Krishnamurti) stress the emptiness of
the results, and those from a GATT perspective
(cg. that by S. K. Bagchi), the fullness of the
potential (both in Sengupta, ed., forthcoming
1980). It might be more useful to pose two
different questions:
to what extent did the Tokyo Round stem the
rising New International Economic Disorder
and the New Protectionism?
to what extent did it weaken the built-in dis-
crimination against the periphery which has
historically characterised the normal working
of the MTN?
The answer to the first question must be: some-
thing but not much. Tariff reductions were con-
tinued and some serious steps toward regulating,
and perhaps lowering, non-tariff barriers were
taken in the codes. A common front was pre-
served, at least verbally, against a reversion to
l930s-style trade wars and beggar-my-neighbour
export promotion and import containment. But
no steps were taken to increase surveillance
powers or to halt back alley assaults on trade, via
private cartels, quango (mixed state-private)
cartels, public cartels (cg. EUROFER), 'voluntary
quotas', reference prices, etc.
For the South the assessment must be even
gloomier. 'Selective safeguards' as adumbrated by
the EEC are a generalisation of the trade war
against peripheral exporters already proceeding
in textiles under the aegis of the MFA. There is
strong pressure to whittle away the access legally
provided under GATT, even though there is, as
yet, no agreement on 'selective safeguards' or
surveillance (see Herald Tribune, 24 July 1979;
The Guardian, 25 July 1979).
Exclusion Enhanced
The answer to the second question must be that
the Tokyo Round increased discrimination in
four ways:
there were justified complaints not only from
clearly peripheral countries but even from
those on the OECD periphery (like Australia2)
and smaller industrial states (like the Nordic
group), that only Japan, the EEC and the USA
had been able to participate meaningfully and
that all others had been presented with virtual
'take it or leave it' offers;
tariff cuts were about 10 per cent on tropical
products (raw and processed), 20 per cent on
labour intensive manufactures, 40 per cent in
capital intensive and high technology manu-
facturesprecisely the pattern that has made
previous MTNs far more liberalising for North-
North than for South to North trade;
the codes on non-tariff barriers are very com-
plex and, with the exception of that on
government purchases, benefit only the
signatories. They are drafted to meet industrial
economy needs, will not really be open to-
or usable bymost periphery states and are
drafted as self regulating, ie. they are not
under general GATT surveillance. Thus they
can provide cover for discrimination by signa-
tories (industrial capitalist economies) against
non-signatories (periphery economies), unlike
such special provisions as the GSP and intra-
Third World trade preferences which are left
squarely within GATT guidelines and under its
surveillance;
moves to legalise 'selective safeguards', as have
been cited above.
2 Australia wasand is, judging from recent conversations
with senior personnelparticularly bitter. As a result it
may well not sign the Tokyo Round agreements. It liad
gone with a package of offers (cg. on automobiles) and
requests (e.g. on processed foods) but found nobody willing
to negotiate.
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This record can be assessed only as increasing
discrimination against the peripheral economies
and eroding their right of access on equal terms
to industrial capitalist economy markets.
Southern Tactics and Priorities: a Critique
In the Tokyo MTN, the South's tactics failed to
achieve results and its priority changes were not
achieved. It is true that the Big Three virtually
ignored both the South and the guidelines which
they had initially agreed and which included
Southern priorities such as tropical products. It is
also true that the demand for 'selective safe-
guards', at least in the EEC formulation,3
amounted to overt aggression both against the
South and against the basic principles of GATT.
In the circumstances, therefore, the South was
doomed to loses whatever its tactics. Nonetheless,
a reappraisal of tactics and priorities is needed
since their continued use is unlikely to yield
improved results.
At least six approaches need questioning:
the stress on preferences, and a GSP which
focuses on a particular group of countries as
opposed to generalised tariff cuts on goods of
particular interest to one or more peripheral
economies. The GSP is not generalised. It is
drafted to include goods Third World coun-
tries cannot export and to limit or exclude
those they can. The value to the South of any
conceivable cut via the GSP is considerably
smaller than the value of cutting tariffs on
tropical products, processed goods, or labour
intensive manufactured goods, by the same pro-
portion as has been applied to automobiles,
computers, or machine tools;
the failure to insist on active participation in
the drafting of codes on non-tariff barriers
which are often more damaging to access than
tariffs;
the perception of GATT as a forum which
pushes a neo-free trade line that is not helpful
to developing economies and which uses
procedures that make effective participation
hard. While this perception is historically
reasonable, the alternative to neo-free trade is
currently straightforward negative discrimina-
3 The US formulation was milder and less clearly anti-periphery as was the Japanese also; they too are a potential
target for selective measures. Within the EEC the hard
line proponents of selective discrimination were the UK
and Franceunderstandable again as they have the
greatest number of sick industries potentially or presently
facing problems in meeting Third World (or other)
competition.
38
tian, so that GATT's philosophy is at least a
potential interim defense against Northern neo-
mercantilism. With the periphery forming a
majority in GATT's overall policy forum (all
members), some changes in procedure might
have been won and, with more periphery
expert personnel, more resources might have
been devoted to exploiting whatever oppor-
tunities for participation did exist;
the stonewalling tactics on the 'differentiation'
issue and its corollary, 'graduation', (whereby
some middle income countries would be
requested to make reciprocal trade concessions).
In particular the South argued as if the choice
were between O per cent reciprocity now and
100 per cent tomorrow, which was at least
psychologically, and probably also operationaliy,
unsound. Setting up unreal alternatives and a
maze of technical hurdles for proponents of
change is a defensive tactic for those who find
the status quo acceptable or any change likely
to be for the worse. For the UK at UNCTAD
given the delegation's perception of UK
interests and 77 powerit was a splendid
approach; for the South in the MTN it was
much more questionable;
the failure, until the Arusha 77 meeting, to
develop a firm line that all trade restrictions
should be brought back into the glare of GATT
and out of the shadows of the back alleys (see
UNCTAD (1) 1979: 30-35), which was probably
very costly. The immediate danger is a con-
tinued erosion of access. 'Deals' such as the
1978 MFA between a major industrial power
and a single ldc, or cartels organised by
industrial economies under pressure only from
anti-import interests, provide a less favourable
setting for resisting such erosion than GATT
whose rules and structures oppose restrictions
and whose relative openness means that pro-
trade interests can also bring influence to bear;
only at Arusha and Manila (see UNCTAD
1979) did the 77 align themselves with OECD
(Group B) calls for opposition to increased
protectionism. This tardiness in making com-
mon cause on a genuinely common concern
(positive sum game) prevented a real impact
on what at Arusha/Manila the 77 saw as its
corollary: international monitoring of special
trade restrictions to ensure that they were
accompanied by adjustment and were phased
out and not repeated. While Group B agreed
that GATT could in principle study and
report, but not monitor or enforce, it was too
late by the time of Manila to feed this back
into the Tokyo MTN. In retrospect the time to
have begun this line of tactics was at the 1976
Nairobi UNCTAD.
To criticise in this way is not to 'blame the
victim'. It is to argue that the 77 need to recosi-
sider their tactics and priorities if they are to
avert a continued worsening of access to
industrial economy markets for their processed,
manufactured and temperate agricultural exports
and even more so if they are to have any real
chance of reversing the trend. Precisely because
they lack the economic power to enforce change,
they have a special need to identify short and
medium term common concerns and appropriate
tactics for exploiting them.
Where Now?
Clearly GATT will not begin another general
tariff-cutting round in the near future. The world
economic situation is not propitious, the Tokyo
Round's bruises are still tender, and for most
manufactured goods tariffs are not the chief
obstacle to trade. Equally clearly, few states find
the present situation satisfactory. The New Inter-
national Economic Disorder advances. The New
Protectionism is in constant danger of breaking
out into open trade wars. Selective safeguards
without international surveillance of adjustment
are manifestly cancerous and likely to spread
from North-South to North-North relations. Thus
there is a general concern that GATTas the
forum and fiagbearer of liberal tradeshould be
seen to be doing something.
This context is one in which the potential for
Group of 77 initiatives to make some progress is
relatively good. Unlike MTN, most proposals for
change would go before GATT as a whole (where
the 77 are in a majority) and would not be bound
so much by procedures and customs which
exclude all but the Big Three. Further, the core
capitalist industrial economies perceive a need to
do something but do not have clear proposals
which would dominate discussion because of the
economic weight of their authors, whatever the
merit of their content.
Clearly GATT is not a tabula rasa. It exists in
the context of international economic structures
and of an international economic crisis. The 77
do not have the power, in the short run or via
GATT, to overturn the first nor to solve the
second. Therefore, to be serious starters for
normal GATT meetings or, perhaps preferably,
special negotiating conferences, Group of 77
proposals must on the one hand offer a significant
contribution to limiting and reversing the present
crisis, and, on the other, have some element of
'mutual interest'some gain to the industrial
economies from accepting (or some loss from
rejecting) them.
What Themes?
In drawing up a checklist of areas for proposal
drafting and action, at least seven stand out:4
Participation
Here the Group of 77 should make common
cause with the smaller industrial (cg. Nordic) and
rich peripheral (cg. Australia) states. It should
use its majority in GATT to secure article and
code changes. Part of the problem lies within the
77. Very few of its members can mount adequate
teams to cover all GATT issues and for most
only a few issues/products are critical at any one
time. This implies a need for coordinated prepara-
tionsuch as UNCTAD studies, a Group of 77
technical group, exchange of national work; for
joint Group of 77 or sub-group positions worked
out complete with tactics and failback positions
before major sessions; and for agreeing on spokes-
men states on each issue so that, taken as a
whole, the 77 participate coherently and force-
fully across the board.
Illumination
Unless neo-mercantilism, the New Protectionism
and bush fire trade wars or worse are to triumph,
it is vital to get 'trade restrictionism' back into
the glare of GATT where it may be possible to
transmute it into some less damaging (and over
the long run positively beneficial) form of 'trade
management'. This is a common interest area-
especially for the exporters of the North. It
requires that 'management' of trade be accepted
as a fact, subjected to formal GATT guidelines,
negotiated in GATT fora serviced by the GATT
Secretariat,5 and monitored via, and. subject to
challenge in, GATT fora. This exists already for
tariff barriers but there is an urgent need to
extend coverage to 'cartels', 'voluntary agree-
ments', 'negotiated quotas', and to put an end to
back alley knifing of trade and to the ultimate
obscenity, which is to have coercive, trade
destructive arrangements like the MFA of 1978
which deny all principles of managed or liberal
traderegistered as GATT protocols.
4 Some of these areas are treated in more detail in the
author's oaper in Sengupta (forthcoming 1990).
5 The GATT Secretariat, ironically, prefers cartel talks (cg.
the abortive OECD feelers In respect to steel) and trade
destruction schemes (cg. MFA) to be negotiated outsideGATT. This attempt to keep GA'l'T's hands clean, how-
ever, scents reminiscent of the traditional ostrich with itshead in the sand, or of Pontius Pilatenot an effective way
of orotecting neo-free trade or transmuting it to managed
trade.
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GAll.' supervision of 'adjustment'
Safeguard clauses will remain. The present
GATT formulations are unsound. A system
which allowed selective safeguards under clear
guidelines would be an improvement on the st atus
quo. Such guidelines would involve prior negotia-
tions, effective compensation, and a requirement
that selective imposition against one state would
involve imposition against all larger import flows.
It is essential to rebut and to block action on the
EEC's claim that it always has imposed selective
safeguards (partly true), will continue to do so
(only too true) and has the right to do so as it
sees fit under GATT (totally at variance with the
Articles). But a quid pro quo, which is also in
the mutual interest of both sides, is that GATT
should have guidelines for, and at least investiga-
tory and reporting (preferably surveillance and
adjudication) powers over, 'adjustment' measures
and safeguards. These should include time limits,
staged phase-out, bars to reimposition, and
requirements for national measures adequate to
make a return to liberal trade practicable at the
end of the 'safeguard' restriction period. Such
restrictions and guidelinesin a tighter form-
do exist within econontic unions (cg. the EEC);
they are necessary if 'liberalising' the right to
invoke safeguards is not to be destructive of inter-
national trade in general.
Protocol participation and monitoring
The codes on non-tariff barriers are potentially
valuable to Group of 77 members. But to exploit
that potential, revisions are needed. First, the
codes should not be in self-governing protocols
administered by signatories only, but dependent
on GATT articles and on challenge and monitor-
ing by GATT (like GSP and economic coopera-
tion among developing countries, or ECDC).
Second, the operation of the codes should be
made less complex so that interested Group of
77 members could join and participate. In
particular, they should have provision for 'pro-
tocol management committees' with a member-
ship that reflects the various interest groups-
core OECD, rich periphery, NICs, OPEC, core
77rather than simply the balance of protocol
signatories. This approach is analogous to that of
the Committee of 15 for GATT itself. Third, the
approach of the Government Purchases Code
which extends its benefits to non-signatory ides
should be extended to the other codes/protocol.
Redress past discrimination
The 77 should propose that the degree of tariff
cuts on all classes of products and major items
over the life of GATT be analysed with a view to
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equalising the reduction in tariff protection
accorded them. This would demonstrate how
selectively and systematically GATT cuts have
been biased against tropical products, processed
raw materials, and labour intensive manufactures,
and it would lay a foundation for concrete pro-
posais to phase out that bias by selective tariff
cuts.
Differentiation, graduation and reciprocity
Clearly the 77 are not identical in economic
structure, productive force or strength. Clearly
also at some point reciprocity needs to be phased
in by a rapidly developing manufactured goods
exporter. To attempt to deny these realities simply
opens the 77 to semi-covert pressures for bilateral
concessions and the risk of open, unilateral
'reciprocity imposition' by the Big Three. Serious
thought needs to be given to the 77's proposals
for guidelines. These might include: defining an
intermediate category of states (in terms of GDP
per capita, and share of man'ufactures in GDP
and exports); requiring such states, however
defined, to offer GSP; and requiring reciprocity on
those manufactured goods in which they had a
substantial export surplus and export volume.
Such a positive approach would be tactically,
psychologically and, hopefully, substantively
sounder than stone-walling.
Adjudication
If GATT is to be effective in monitoring and
surveillance on a broader front (eg. safeguards,
adjustment, non tariff barriers, phasing in
reciprocity) it needs more than guidelines. It
needs a capacity to collect and interpret data in
a way which neither views the very idea of
'management' as a departure from the Holy Grail
of Pure Free Trade (the present GATT Secre-
tariat position) nor sees any and all manipulative
destruction of trade measures as inevitable con-
comitants of 'managed free trade' (the apparent
EEC position). But even more, it needs rules and
fora for processing and adjudicating on challenges
promptly and coherently. The details need
clarification and articulation; the need is clear.
If the Group of 77 is to take the initiative in
GATT, it should encourage its non-GATT
members to get in and add their voices (and votes)
and also take a lead in seeing that adequate pre-
paration of proposals is done by a technical group
of the 77, by UNCTAD on contract, and by
member states. Equally it should seek to build
up support for its approach by liaison with states
like Australia, Canada, New Zealand, Turkey
and the Nordic group which in many respects
have similar concerns. Probably a 77 trade
ministers' meeting (like Arusha) will be needed
after officials have sketched an agenda and
documentation. Certainly getting a set of pro-
posals to the Group of 77 members of the GAlT
Committee of 15 in the first half of 1980 would
be a desirable step toward achieving a positive
trend in GATT and in trade.
Contexts and Lhnits
These suggestions, even if pursued successfully,
would not achieve the New International
Economic Ordermuch less the new Jerusalem.
Nor do they purport to be a complete checklist
for international economic policy initiatives
by the Group of 77 collectively or individually.
ECDC, finance, technology transfer, transfer pric-
ing and restrictive business practices are all
critical areas for which similar limits are needed.
However, the substance of ECDC is no more a
topic for global fora than is the EEC (possibly
both should be, but not ECDC alone) and the
others are on the agenda of fora other than
GATF.
The purposes for pursuing initiatives along the
lines suggested would be:
crisis management and damage containment
against the New International Economic Dis-
order and the New Protectionism;
creating a basis on which restructuring out of
recessioneg. Global Keynesianism, two way
NICs-OECD core trade expansionhas a better
chance of being explored seriously;
reversing the trend toward the increasing
marginalisation and diminishing participation of
states outside the Big Three (USA, Japan, EEC)
in decisions and structures affecting/regulating
international trade;
seeking to reduce both the impact of unwel-
come stochastic shocks and the pressures for
unilateral trade destruction to resolve domestic
problems by introducing minimum elements of
collective management (indicative planning)
into international trade frameworks.
These are limited purposes. However, they are
also potentially attainable ones which could pro-
duce direct benefits and create a context in which
more far-reaching changes would have a better
chance of receiving serious positive consideration.
References
The Guardian, 25 July 1979, 'Multilateral Trade
Talks Break Down'
Herald Tribune, 24 July 1979, 'World Trade
Talks Fail to Set Safeguards'
Sengupta, A. K., (cd.), forthcoming 1980, Com-
modities, Finance and Trade, Francis Pinter,
London
Tiruchelvam, N. and R. Krishnaswamy, forth-
coming 1979, Trade and Development, Marga,
Colombo
UNCTAD, 1979, Developments in International
Trade: Protectionism, [Draft Resolutionsub-
sequently passed], (TD/L 188), Geneva
(1)1979, see Editorial references
41
